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safety measures, based on the expected utility theory 
Eirik Bjorheim Abrahamsen, Frank Asche
Abstract 
This paper focuses on how access to an insurance market should influence investments in 
safety measures in accordance with the ruling paradigm for decision-making under 
uncertainty—the expected utility theory. We show that access to an insurance market in most 
situations will influence investments in safety measures. For an expected utility maximizer, an 
overinvestment in safety measures is likely if access to an insurance market is ignored, while 
an underinvestment in safety measures is likely if insurance is purchased without paying 
attention to the possibility for reducing the probability and/or consequences of an accidental 
event by safety measures. 
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1. Introduction
Principally, there are three alternative ways to treat risk in projects that affect safety. One can 
(1) take all the consequences when an accidental event occurs, (2) reduce the probability 
and/or the consequences of an accidental event by safety measures or (3) transfer the 
consequences of the occurrence to parties better able to carry them (i.e. buy insurance) 
[1] and [6]. 
When decisions are made with respect to resource use in safety measures and the insurance 
market in the risk analysis literature, it is common that the investments in safety measures are 
not affected by access to an insurance market [9]. As there is no theoretical justification of 
this practice, we will in this paper discuss whether or not access to an insurance market should 
influence the investments in safety measures. We use the expected utility theory as basis for 
our argumentation. The expected utility theory is the backbone for all economic thinking and 
states that the decision alternative with highest expected utility is the best alternative. We will 
not repeat the rationality of this principle, but it has validity under very reasonable conditions 
for logical and consistent behaviour; see for example [10]. 
We show that the investment in safety measures for an expected utility maximizer will 
normally be higher in situations where there is no access to an insurance market compared to 
a situation where such an access does exist. If access to an insurance market is not taken into 
consideration, this will normally lead to an overinvestment in safety measures for an expected 
utility maximizer. One could make an argument that is inverse too that an underinvestment in 
safety measures is very likely if we purchase insurance without paying attention to the fact 
that the probability and consequence of an accidental event can be reduced by safety 
measures. 
Our work is closely related to the analysis of Ehrlich and Becker [6]. They also discuss the 
influence of insurance on safety measures with reference to the expected utility theory. Their 
main message to a large extent overlaps with our conclusions. However, the basis for their 
analysis is different from ours. In Ref. [6] all the consequences of an accidental event are 
transformed to one comparable unit (money). This is in strong contrast to much of the risk 
literature, where it is often regarded as problematic to compare the risk of fatalities with 
damages to property or even worse, increased consumption due to lower investments in risk 
reducing measures; see for example [2], [3], [4], [8], [9] and [12]. In our paper we introduce 
fatalities as a separate variable in the expected utility framework in addition to money. In this 
respect, our work expands the model of Ehrlich and Becker [6]. Thus, our model gives a basis 
for showing how non-economic variables interact with the economic variables and how an 
insurance market affects the investments in safety measures. This is of interest due to the fact 
that transformation of all attributes to one common comparable unit is avoided by many 
safety experts, and is also regarded as unethical by some [9]. 
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 an expected utility model is developed in 
order to show how an expected utility maximizer manages risk in situations first without and 
then with access to an insurance market. Then in Section 3 a short discussion about the value 
of a statistical life is given, seen in relation to the model developed in Section 2. Finally, in 
Section 4 special attention is given to the difference between optimal investments in safety 
measures for the two situations analysed in Section 2, before some conclusions are provided. 
2. An economic model
In this section an economic model is developed to show how an expected utility maximizer 
manages risk in situations first without and then with access to an insurance market. In 
Section 3 special attention is given to the difference between optimal investments in safety 
measures for these two situations analysed in this section. 
2.1. When access to an insurance market does not exist 
Consider a firm that has preferences with respect to wealth y and a non-economic variable h. 
In the following, h is referred to as fatalities, but could in principle be all types of non-
economic values such as injuries, environmental damages, etc. The preferences are 
represented by the utility function 
U(y,h) (1) 
We follow the standard in the literature and assume that the utility function is increasing and 
concave in y, which implies that the firm’s marginal utility (∂U/∂y) diminishes as the wealth 
increases. The firm then considers the utility of an extra dollar of wealth to be higher when it 
is relatively poorer than the utility of an extra dollar when it is relatively richer. We also 
assume that the utility function is decreasing and convex in h. The firm then considers that the 
disutility of one extra fatality is reduced by the number of fatalities. This implies that the 
disutility for the first fatality is higher than the disutility of going from 100 to 101 fatalities. 
To make the model tractable, we make the standard simplifying assumption that there are only 
two states of the world, one where there is no accidents and one where there is one. The 
firm’s wealth and number of fatalities are respectively y1 and h1 (h1=0) if an accidental event 
does not occur. The wealth reduces to a level y2 (y2<y1) and the number of fatalities increases 
to a level h2 (h2>0) if an accidental event occurs. The initial number of fatalities given an 
accidental event and the initial wealth are h0 and y0, respectively. The probability of an 
accidental event (being in state 2) is denoted p. 
Suppose that the firm may invest r (the effort) in self-protection that affects the consequences 
in the case of an accidental event. We assume that the cost of effort r, c(r) is an increasing and 
convex function; ∂c/∂r>0 and ∂2c/∂r2<0. This means that the cost increases by an increased 
effort by the firm, but gradually the increased effort in self-protection contributes to an 
increased cost by the firm, for example caused by new production technology, etc. 
The magnitude of the reduction in losses in wealth (l) and the number of fatalities (v) depends 
on the investments in r. As a simplifying assumption we say that the reduction in losses in 
wealth and the reduction in the number of fatalities of the investments in self-protection are 
deterministic. We assume that the reduction in losses in wealth when an accident occurs due 
to the investment in r, l(r), is increasing and convex; ∂l/∂r<0 and ∂2l/∂r2<0. The same 
assumptions are also given to v(r), which means that ∂v/∂r<0 and ∂2v/∂r2<0. From these 
assumptions one can see that the firm’s marginal utility from self-protection diminishes as the 
investments in self-protection increase. One can, for example, say that the utility of the first 
dollar spent on self-protection is higher than the utility of the last dollar spent on self-
protection. 
Under these assumptions, the firm’s problem is to choose r to maximize 
EU=(1−p)U(y1,h1)+pU(y2,h2)
where 
y1=y0−c(r);    y2=y0−c(r)−l(r) 
and 
h1=0;    h2=h0−v(r) 
The derivative of the expected utility with respect to r is 
∂EU/∂r=(1−p)U1y(−cr)+pU2y(−cr−lr)+pU2h(−vr)
=−pU2hvr−pU2ylr−[pU2y+(1−p)U1y]cr=0 
where Uiy denotes partial derivatives of Uy with respect to i, lr is the derivative of l with 
respect to r, and cr the derivative of c with respect to r. 
The condition (5) means that the optimal level of self-protection is at the point where the 
marginal utility cost of decrease in the firm’s wealth due to the cost of self-protection, 
[pU2y+(1−p)U1y]cr, is equal to the marginal utility of the self-protection, pU2hvr+pU2ylr. This 
means that the firm’s optimal investment in self-protection is at the point where the utility of 
the last dollar spent on self-protection is equal to the utility of the reduction in losses caused 
by the last dollar spent on self-protection. The marginal utility consists of two parts: (I) the 
marginal utility from an increase in the firm’s wealth through reduction in losses, pU2ylr, and 
(5)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(II) the marginal utility from a decrease in the number of fatalities in the bad state, pU2hvr. 
Hence, even though the firm’s wealth is not being reduced by fatalities, it will influence the 
firm’s decisions as long as the firm cares about avoiding accidents. If this term is removed 
from the problem, that is the firm does not take into account the fatalities that the accidental 
event can cause, the firm will underinvest in risk-reducing measures. This seems to support 
the notion that analysis focusing only on economic factors will lead to underinvestment in 
safety measures, and it will if the effect of these variables are not taken into account. 
However, in the economic literature non-economical variables are usually not removed from 
the decision problem even if wealth is the only attribute included, as non-economic variables 
are transformed to one comparable unit, money [13]. In such cases, the difference in the 
safety investment will be determined by the weight given to these variables in different 
approaches to determining the level of safety investments. 
Note that as long as a reduction of the consequences of an accidental event is costly, there will 
always be negative consequences for the firm if an accidental event occurs. The cost of 
reducing the consequences of an accidental event (or the probability) will usually increase to 
infinite when the consequences approach zero. 
2.2. When access to an insurance market exists 
Until now we have ignored the fact that for some risks the firm has an alternative method to 
handle risk for investment by transferring risk to parties that are better able to carry the 
consequences. Such mechanisms include insurance, use of derivatives and government 
protection. For simplicity, we will here refer to all such mechanisms as insurance as they all 
work in a similar manner. 
Access to an insurance market gives the firm the opportunity to transfer the economic 
consequences of an accidental event to others by compensation, the insurance premium, s. 
The firm’s wealth will then in the good state be reduced by s, while the wealth in the bad state 
will increase with the insurance payment, g. The wealth in the bad state increases when the 
insurance payment increases, which means that the insurance payment is an increasing 
function of s, ∂g/∂s>0. 
Assuming that the insurance market is fair and there is no administration cost, the insurance 
premium is equal to the expected loss [5]. Say, for example, that the total loss is 100 if an 
accidental event occurs and that the probability of an accidental event is 0.1. Then the 
insurance premium is 10. If the firm pays 5 for insurance, then the payment in case of an 
accidental event will be just half of the total loss (50). The relation between the insurance 
premium and payment is in other words constant. The relation between the insurance 
premium and the insurance payment is usually set in such a way that the expected cost is 
unaffected [5]. Thus, the insurance payment is both an increasing and linear function in s; 
∂g/∂s>0 and ∂2g/∂s2=0. 
The firm’s problem is then to choose r (the effort in self-protection) and s to maximize 
EU=(1−p)U(y1,h1)+pU(y2,h2) (6) 
Where 
y1=y0−c(r)−s;      y2=y0−c(r)−l(r)+g(s) 
(7)
And 
h1=0;  h2=h0−v(r) (8) 
Note that h2 is a function of the investment in self-protection only, and not of the investment 
in the insurance market. Insurance cannot give a reduction in health in the case of an 
accidental event, but can only give an economic compensation for such losses. 
The first-order conditions for an interior solution are 
 (9) 
 (10) 
Condition (9) is equal to condition (5). Condition (10) says that the optimal level of insurance 
is at the point where the marginal utility from an increase in the firm’s wealth through 
insurance expenditures in the case of an accidental event, pU2ygs, is equal to the marginal 
utility cost of a decrease in the firm’s wealth due to the insurance premium, (1−p)U1y. The 
firm’s optimal investment in insurance is in non-economic terms at the point where the utility 
of the last dollar spent on insurance is equal to the utility of the reduction in losses caused by 
the last dollar spent on insurance. From both (9) and (10) we see that a rational agent facing 
the risk of an accident normally will handle that risk by combining investments in insurance, 
investments in safety measures and to carry the costs of an accident if it happens, such as the 
marginal utility of the different actions are the same. 
Till now attention has been given to how the investments in safety measures are influenced by 
access to an insurance market. We may also easily reconstruct our problem to cover a 
situation which is the opposite: how the investments in the insurance market are influenced by 
the possibility of reducing risk by safety measures. The model (and the first order conditions) 
for the problem is not presented because of the strong relation to the economic model already 
presented. The conclusion is that an underinvestment in safety measures is very likely if we 
purchase insurance without paying attention to the fact that the probability and consequences 
of an accidental event can be reduced by safety measures. 
3. The value of a statistical life
So far we have posed the model in accordance with the principles of many researchers in the 
safety literature in that there is no explicit trade-off between wealth and fatalities. However, 
as we have noted, when a term representing fatalities is included in the model, it will 
influence the magnitude of the investment in safety measures (including insurance). Most 
economists will regard this trade-off as being present independently of whether it is explicitly 
∂EU/∂r=(1−p)U1y(−cr)+pU2y(−cr−lr)+pU2h(−vr)=
−pU2hvr−pU2ylr−[pU2y+(1−p)U1y]cr=0
∂EU/∂s=pU2ygs−(1−p)U1y=0
made, as the decisions made in each case will reveal how many resources one is willing to 
invest, and thereby the value of a statistical life (VSL) [13] and [7]. 
That any decision with respect to investments in safety measures also implies a value of a 
statistical life is most easily seen by reformulating the first-order condition in Eq. (5) as 
(11) 
Here the change in the number of fatalities due to an increase in the investment in safety 
measures is expressed as a function of other terms that are values. By integrating, one can 
then find the VSL given the other choices that have been made. Moreover, if one is willing to 
use this value, the solution of the model will be identical to that of Ehrlich and Becker [6]. 
Hence, the main consequence of not giving a VSL in the analysis is that one allows the 
disutility associated with fatalities to differ between analysis, possibly leading to more 
resources being spent on reducing some types of accidents than other types. 
4. Discussion and conclusion
In economic models of safety investment, there is always a trade-off between the cost of the 
investment in safety measures when an accidental event does not occur, and the benefits in the 
form of lower probability of an accidental event or reduced consequences [6]. This trade-off is 
commonly simplified by representing all consequences with a common unit, money. We 
extend this model by allowing factors without a monetary value to influence the decision 
problem. In general, such factors, like the number of fatalities, will increase a firm’s 
investments in safety measures. We also show that access to an insurance market gives an 
extra option with respect to how risk should be treated. 
With no access to an insurance market the firm will invest in the safety measure up to the 
point where the marginal utility of the safety investment is equal to the marginal utility of 
taking all the consequences if/when an accidental event occurs. In non-economical jargon one 
may say that the firm will invest in self-protection up to the point where the effect of the last 
dollar spent on self-protection is equal to the reduction in losses caused by the last dollar 
spent on self-protection. If the firm’s risk preferences are neutral, the incentives to invest in 
the safety measure will be unaffected by access to an insurance market. The reason is that a 
firm with risk neutral preferences is indifferent between a certain cost (income) and an 
uncertain cost (income) with the same expected value [5]. Thus, an expected utility maximizer 
cannot increase the utility by an investment in an insurance market, as the insurance premium 
is (approximately) equal to the expected costs. 
With risk averse preferences there will be a trade-off between how much to invest in the 
safety measure and how much to insure. A risk averse firm with access to an insurance market 
will invest in the safety measure up to the point where the marginal utility of the safety 
measure is equal to the marginal utility of the insurance. With no access to an insurance 
market (or with risk neutral preferences) the firm will invest in the safety measure up to the 
point where the marginal utility of the safety measure is equal to the marginal utility of taking 
all the consequences if/when an accidental event occurs. From this we see that the decision 
criterion for the firm changes if there is access to an insurance market. 
vr=pU2ylr−[pU2y+(1−p)U1y]cr 
______________________________________
            pU2h
A simple example is used to explain what this difference in decision criterion means for the 
investments in safety measures. Consider a building having a value of one million dollars. 
The probability of a fire resulting in a total loss is 10−4 for a period of one year. This gives an 
expected loss of 100. To reduce the risk the house owner can invest in probability reducing 
measures. Assume that there are two potential probability measures available: one measure 
that reduces the probability of a fire resulting in a total loss to 10−5 at a cost of 50 dollars, and 
one that reduces the probability to 10−6 at a cost of 1000 dollars. To keep the example simple 
we assume that the house owner cannot invest in both probability reducing measures. Based 
on the preferences, the house owner wants to invest in the safety measure that reduces the 
probability to 10−6 at a cost of 1000 dollars. Now, assume that access to an insurance market 
exists. The insurance premium is then 100 as the insurance premium is equal to the expected 
loss. That means that the house owner can be fully insured for 100 dollars a year. Certainly, 
an investment of 1000 dollars for reducing the probability of a fire resulting in a total loss to 
10−6 is not appropriate if access to an insurance market exists. Access to an insurance market 
does not necessarily mean that there will be no investments in safety measures. Returning to 
our example, we see that the house owner can invest 50 dollars in order to reduce the 
probability to 10−5. The expected cost is then 10 dollars if this probability reducing measure is 
implemented. The house owner can then be fully compensated in case of a fire if he invests 60 
dollars a year (50 dollars in the probability reducing measure and 10 dollars in insurance). 
The cheapest way for the house owner to treat the risk is then to spend money on both the 
probability reducing measure and insurance. We may say that spending 50 dollars in the 
probability reducing measure gives a higher utility than spending these dollars on insurance. 
From this point it is more fruitful to spend money on insurance than on further probability 
reducing measures. If the different measures also lead to changed expectation with respect to 
personal injuries or loss of lives due to the fire, this will influence investments in safety 
measures relatively to insurance. 
The exact trade-off between self-protection and insurance will depend on their relative costs. 
In Ref. [11], a comparative static analysis was used to examine the effects of the investments 
in self-protection and insurance of an increase in the insurance cost. These authors have 
shown through the comparative analysis that market insurance and self-protection are 
strategic substitutes in the sense that an increase in the insurance cost reduces the demand for 
market insurance and increases the demand for self-protection, which has become relatively 
cheaper. The fact that insurance cannot give a reduction in losses related to lives and 
environmental issues, does not have any influence on the conclusion. Similarly, an increase in 
the cost of self-protection reduces the demand for self-protection while the demand for 
insurance will increase. 
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